C=US

Agentic Control Plane supporting “Collaborative Superintelligence” (Flower Labs)

Status: minimum viable product (MVP). A working demonstration of the whole control path on two small servers (c=US and c=CA), with synthetic agents and people. Realistic scaling will only occur with sufficient funding.

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Regulators & Legal Counsel

Statutory compliance, purpose and consent duties, and how the design maps to enacted law.

Duty of LoyaltyPurpose and consent controls: signed mandates, data-use checks, one-use permits, nine scenarios.
Utah’s SEDI law (S.B. 275)How Utah’s State-Endorsed Digital Identity law could plug into c=US accounts.
Compliance analysisCandidate control-plane architectures compared against security and compliance standards.
White House AI accord scorecardThe 2026-09-29 accord scored against this project’s documented risks.
Three governance modelsGovernance models for agentic AI, scored against the same ten risks.
Utah AI Policy Act and SEDIThe Act’s safe harbor and Executive Order 2026-08 mapped to c=US controls, with what is and isn’t built.

Enterprise CISOs & Architects

Non-human identity governance, Zero Trust enforcement, short-lived mTLS and lifecycle controls.

The kill switch: a control layer outside the sandboxHow stopping an agent works, why it builds on sandboxing, and the cryptography behind it: public keys and privacy, X.500 and LDAP, Kerckhoffs, Shannon and Turing.
Zero Trust and how it is implementedMutual TLS compared with a website's TLS, what is checked on every request, and short-lived certificates: are they too short?
Identity vs. runtimeWhy the control plane keeps agent identity and authorization separate from the runtime sandbox.
Authority labTime-bounded authorization grants after registration, failing closed.
Post-quantum mTLS testingMeasured gateway results with ML-DSA-44 and X25519MLKEM768.
Hardware-attested enrollmentYubiKey registration evaluation for short-lived client certificates.
Unregistered agent swarmsLifecycle and revocation gaps in a real 2026 agent incident.
Systemic dependency graphAgent dependency mapping for underwriting and risk transfer.

AI Engineers & Developers

Schemas, agent-to-agent exchange, and fixtures you can run in the browser.

Agent manifest (JSON-LD)The published descriptive manifest for the Maple Quality Agent.
Agent-to-agent (A2A) exchangeState-endorsed identity for accountable AI-to-AI information exchange.
Registration fixtureGenerate demonstration CSR, certificate and LDIF for a maple agent (Utah variant).
Verify XAdES-TCheck signer, digest, certificate and timestamp on agent-signed XML.
Encryption and standards FAQAlgorithms, standards and compatibility (see also the glossary).
SchemasThe OpenLDAP registry schema, delegation JSON Schema, canonical scopes and example LDIF.
Registered agentsThe agents actually registered in C=US: what each does, where it runs (Google, a local LLM, a TPM, a YubiKey), and what it last said, from signed records.
Trust registryAsk C=US, over ToIP TRQP v2.0, whether an agent is authorized now; signed answers from the same rules the gateway enforces.
Not yet published: an SDK.